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Demand and supply analysis in fisheries often indicates the presence of instabilities and 
multiple equilibria, both in open access conditions and in the socially optimal solution. 
The associated management problems are further intensified by uncertainty on the 
evolution of the resource stock or on demand conditions. In this paper the fishery 
management problem is handled using robust optimal control, where the objective is to 
choose a harvesting rule that will work, in the sense of preventing instabilities and 
overfishing, under a range of admissible specifications for the stock recruitment 
equation. The paper derives robust harvesting rules, leading to a unique equilibrium, 
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Demand and supply analysis in …sheries has been associated with instabil-
ities and multiple equilibria, both in the context of an open access …shery
and a socially optimal …shery.1 The source of instability is the emergence
of a backward bending supply curve which is the consequence of biological
over…shing that occurs when e¤ort expands beyond the level corresponding
to the maximum sustainable yield. The combination of a standard downward
sloping demand curve with the backward bending supply curve can produce
an odd number of interchanging locally stable and locally unstable market
equilibria in open access …sheries. There exist locally stable equilibria corre-
sponding to high price and low harvesting, which can be seen as an indication
of over…shing. It is interesting to note that a similar picture can emerge even
in …shery that is managed in a socially optimal way. The discounted supply
curve is also backward bending for positive discount rates. As a result, there
are demand conditions under which multiple equilibria and instabilities are
present even in optimally controlled …sheries.
The problems caused by the emergence of instabilities and over…shing in
…sheries are further intensi…ed by uncertainty, which is an important aspect
of resource economics. Uncertainty in this context can be associated with the
evolution of the resource stock2 or with demand conditions. Thus both supply
and demand shocks could disturb a locally stable …shery and lead to insta-
bilities and over…shing. As Clark (1990) points out, many stock-recruitment
relationships are poorly understood and di¢cult to estimate given the exist-
1See for example Clark (1990).
2See for example Conrad and Clark (1988, Ch. 5), McDonald and Hanf (1992), Clark
(1990, Ch. 11), Danielson (2002), Tu and Wilman (1992), Conrad (2000, Ch. 7), Weitzman
(2002), Androkovich and K.R.Stollery (1989).
3ing data, which in most cases is of low quality. As a result regulation based
on mispeci…ed biological dynamics might be ine¤ective in achieving the de-
sired targets. This brings into the picture the issue of scienti…c uncertainty
and its e¤ects on …shery management.
Our use of the term uncertainty refers to cases where the possible out-
comes are known but the decision maker is unable to assign unique probabil-
ities. The possibility of multiple prior distributions has largely been absent
from recent economic literature, although it is often a more appropriate set-
ting (see Woodward and Bishop (1997)). Introducing an axiom of uncertainty
aversion, as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), a maximin model is obtained
where the optimal choice maximizes utility for the worst probability distrib-
ution in a given set.3 In our analysis of …sheries, scienti…c uncertainty relates
to the stock-recruitment equation. It re‡ects the possibility that although
the estimated model, often referred to as the approximating or benchmark
model, is consistent with the data, there is a set of alternative models de-
scribing the evolution of the resource stock which are also consistent with
the data, and thus could be regarded as possibly true. It is important to
stress that if the benchmark model is mispeci…ed, and resource stock evolu-
tion corresponds to a worse than expected scenario, then the optimal control
solution for the benchmark model could result in a …shery with instabilities
and over…shing. This observation provides support for adopting a “precau-
tionary principle” in …shery management when there is scienti…c uncertainty.
When the extensive collapse of …sheries over the last century is considered,
precaution in designing management rules for regulating …sheries seems to
3See also Roseta-Palma and Xepapadeas (forthcoming) for an application of robust
control to water management, and Chevé and Congar (2000), Chevé and Congar (forth-
coming) for alternative set de…nitions.
4be desirable.
Managing a …shery in this context suggests formulating the management
problem as a robust control problem along the lines developed in Hansen and
Sargent (2001a), Hansen and Sargent (2003). The objective is to choose a
harvesting rule that will work, in the sense of preventing instabilities and
over…shing, under a range of di¤erent model speci…cations of the stock-
recruitment equation. Robust control can be directly related to uncertainty
aversion and precaution, and as Hansen and Sargent (2001b) explicitly state
“a preference for robustness induces context-speci…c precaution”.
The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of scienti…c uncertainty
and the potentially induced instabilities and overexploitation in …sheries by
introducing robust control methodologies in …shery management. Our main
…nding is that by an appropriate choice of the robustness parameter, which is
a parameter indicating preference for robustness, a regulator that manages
a …shery for the social optimum could eliminate multiple equilibria insta-
bilities and potential over…shing. The robust harvesting rules that lead to a
unique equilibrium can be used to design decentralized regulation with policy
instruments such as transferable quota or landing fees.
2 Bionomic Instabilities in Fishery Manage-
ment4
We begin by considering a standard …shery model where biomass evolves
deterministically according to
_ x(t) = F (x(t)) ¡ h(t) (1)
4This section follows Clark (1990, section 5.2), and will serve as background for the
development of robust control methodology in the following section.
5where x(t) is …sh biomass, h(t) denotes the harvest rate and F (x(t)) is
the growth function for stock-recruitment. One common example is the
logistic growth function, where F (x) = rx(1 ¡ x=k): Biomass stock for
the maximum sustainable yield is de…ned as xmsy = argmaxxF (x); while
xk : F (xk) = 0;xk > 0 denotes the carrying capacity biomass. Let unit
harvest cost, c(x(t)) be a nonincreasing function of the …sh stock x: Then
for any price p; the pro…t ‡ow is determined as5
… = (p ¡ c(x))h (2)
The open access supply in equilibrium is determined by the conditions
h = F (x) (3)
p = c(x) (4)
Solving (4) for x and substituting into (3) we obtain equilibrium supply
as h = F (x(p)): If demand is given by h = D(p); market equilibrium under




















where p = P (h) is the inverse demand curve. Typical bell-shaped growth
functions together with stock e¤ects on harvest cost and a positive discount
rate may give rise to a backward bending supply curve. Combined with a
downward sloping demand curve, this could induce multiple equilibria. With
three equilibria, the middle one indicates bionomic instability while one of the
locally stable equilibria indicates over…shing with low equilibrium harvesting
at a relatively high price.6 Multiple equilibria could be the result of prevailing
demand conditions; or could arise from demand shocks.
5t is dropped to simplify notation.
6See for example …gure 5.11 in Clark (1990), for logistic growth and unit cost equal to
c
x.
6To analyze socially optimal …shery management we introduce a social
planner or a regulator maximizing net surplus de…ned as U (h) ¡ c(x)h;
where U (h) =
R h
0 P (u)du so that U0 (h) = P (h): The welfare maximization






¡‰t [U (h(t)) ¡ c(x(t))h(t)]dt (5)
s.t. _ x(t) = F (x(t)) ¡ h(t) ;x(0) = x0 > 0 (6)
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is:
H = U (h) ¡ c(x)h + ‚[F (x) ¡ h] (7)
with optimality conditions
U
0 (h) = ‚ + c(x) ; U
0 (h) = P (h) (8)
_ ‚ = [‰ ¡ F
0 (x)]‚ + c
0 (x)h (9)
along with biomass evolution (6) and the transversality condition at in…nity.
Di¤erentiating (8) with respect to time and substituting into (9) we obtain
the dynamic system that characterizes the optimal paths of harvest and …sh







0 (h) ¡ c(x)) + c
0 (x)F (x) ; U
0 (h) = P (h)]
(10)
whereas stock behaves according to (6). The deterministic steady state equi-
librium is de…ned as _ h = _ x = 0: At the steady state, market equilibrium is
characterized by
P (h) = p; p = c(x) ¡
c0 (x)F (x)
‰ ¡ F 0 (x)
= S‰ (x); h = F (x) (11)
7which describe demand, supply, and biological equilibrium respectively. Solv-
ing the stock equilibrium equation of (11); market equilibrium when the …sh-
ery is optimally managed is de…ned as
(p
¤;h
¤) : P (h
¤) = S‰ (x(h
¤)) ; p
¤ = P (h
¤) (12)
The discounted supply curve determined by (11) is backward bending as
in the case of open access …shery and could induce multiple equilibria, as
presented in the phase diagram of …gure 1.7
[Figure 1]
For the _ h1 = 0 isocline there is a unique steady state which is saddle point
stable at M. However, a demand shock could shift this isocline to _ hs = 0 and
induce multiple equilibria, at M1; M2; and M3; with the middle one being un-
stable and M3 indicating over…shing. Furthermore, if the benchmark model
for stock evolution is misspeci…ed, it is possible for a worse than estimated
model for the stock-recruitment relationship F (x) to be realized. Under de-
mand shocks and misspeci…cation of the stock-recruitment relationship both
the _ x = 0 isocline and the _ h = 0 isocline shift and multiple equilibria could
also be induced. If these shifts yield a system such as _ x2 = 0; _ h2 = 0 then
multiple equilibria emerge at ED
1 ;ED
2 ;ED
3 . It is also possible for the true
model to correspond to an _ x = 0 isocline even further below _ x2 = 0; so that
an equilibrium with harvesting rule _ h2 = 0 does not exist. This harvesting
rule would lead to resource collapse under such circumstances.
The possibility of multiple equilibria at the social optimum presents prob-
lems for regulation. For example, the regulatory instruments could have been
7See also Clark (1990) …gures 5.17 and 6.12.
8designed to steer the system towards M1 but due to demand shocks and/or
misspeci…cation, as described above, the systems could converge, for appro-
priate initial conditions, to a state like ED
3 which is an over…shing steady
state. To prevent regulatory complications arising from such cases a dif-
ferent type of regulation is required. The idea behind the robust control
methodology, as applied in this paper to …shery management, is to help de-
sign rules which under the worst possible scenario for the stock-recruitment
relationship will prevent instabilities, steady state multiple equilibria and
biological over…shing.
3 Robust Control and Fishery Management
To develop the robust control methodology we introduce uncertainty in the
stock-recruitment equation. Let (-;F;G) be a complete probability space,
and let xt = x(!;t); ht = h(!;t) be the stochastic processes for the …sh
biomass and harvesting, respectively. Moreover, let Bt = B (!;t) be a Wiener
process, E (dBt) = 0, var(dBt) = dt.
The stochastic social optimization problem for the …shery can be de…ned
as the choice of a nonanticipating harvesting process h(!;t) that maximizes








¡‰t [U (ht) ¡ c(xt)ht]dt (13)
s.t. dx(t) = [F (xt) ¡ ht]dt + ￿dBt (14)
￿ > 0; x(0) = x0 > 0 nonrandom (15)
xt ¸ 0;ht ¸ 0 (16)
where xt is the state variable and ht is the control variable of the stochastic
control problem.
In equation (14) the term F (xt) ¡ ht represents the expected change
in the …sh biomass at any given point in time, while the term ￿dBt is the
random amount of biomass change, with zero mean and variance ￿2: In this
setup, which is a typical stochastic control problem, the manager is assumed
to know the behavior of stochastic shocks well enough to fully trust the
characterization of the probability distribution implied by (14). This basic
assumption leads to a decision on optimal harvest paths. However, it is quite
possible (indeed likely, given natural system characteristics and information
gaps) that the distribution is only an estimate, so that there is a degree
of uncertainty attached not just to the speci…c realization of the random
shock but also to the distribution itself. In other words, the planner might
want to consider his own doubts about the model he is using to represent
randomness.9
Following Hansen et al. (2002), we regard (14) as a benchmark model. If
we assume that the social planner knows the benchmark model then there
8The basic assumption is that species biomass ‡uctuates continuously and that these
stochastic in‡uences are adequately represented by Wiener processes.
9There are two essentially di¤erent types of uncertainty involved. Chevé and Congar
(2000) refer to these as risk (not knowing the precise value the shock will take) and
imprecision (not being sure of the model).
10are no concerns about robustness to model misspesi…cation. Otherwise, these
concerns for robustness to model misspeci…cation are re‡ected by a family of
stochastic perturbations to the Brownian motion fBt : t ¸ 0g: The pertur-
bation distorts the probabilities G implied by (14) and replaces G by another
probability measure Q: The main idea is that stochastic processes under Q
will be di¢cult to distinguish from G using a …nite amount of data. The
perturbed model is constructed by replacing Bt in (14) with
Bt = zt +
Z t
0
Rsds; or dBt = dzt + Rtdt (17)
where fzt : t ¸ 0g is a Brownian motion and fRt : t ¸ 0g is a measurable
drift distortion. Changes in the distribution of Bt will be parametrized as
drift distortions to a …xed Brownian motion fzt : t ¸ 0g: The distortions will
be zero under the measure G; in which case Bt and zt coincide.
Now the social planner’s concerns about misspeci…cation of the model
describing the evolution of …sh biomass can be expressed using (17) to write
the distorted model
dxt = [F (xt) ¡ ht + ￿Rt]dt + ￿dzt (18)
Thus, in the …shery management problem under model misspeci…cation,
equation (14) is replaced by (18). Now, following Hansen et al. (2002), the


















s.t. (18),(15) and (16)
In problem (19) the social planner is the maximizing agent that chooses
harvesting ht to maximize surplus, while “Nature” is the minimizing agent
11that chooses the “worst case distortion” to the stock-recruitment relationship.
The robustness parameter ￿ can be interpreted as the Lagrangian multiplier
associated with an entropy constraint, which de…nes the maximum speci…-
cation error in the stock-recruitment relationship that the social planner is
willing to accept.10 A value ￿ = +1 signi…es no preference for robustness in
the sense that the decision-maker has no doubts on the model, while lower
values for ￿ indicate such a preference and such doubts.
Note that a speci…c choice of a maximum speci…cation error that the regu-
lator is willing to consider implies a speci…c choice of ￿: Conversely, a speci…c
choice of the robustness parameter ￿ implies a speci…c maximum speci…ca-
tion error. Thus a desire to be robust, as re‡ected in ￿; can be translated
to a maximum acceptable speci…cation error and vice-versa. In…nite ￿ im-
plies that the regulator is not willing to consider any speci…cation error and
regards the benchmark model as a good model, or rather, as the model.
Using the Fleming and Souganidis (1989) result on the existence of a
recursive solution to the multiplier problem, Hansen et al. (2002) show that
problem (19) can be transformed into a stochastic in…nite horizon two-player
game where the Bellman-Isaacs conditions imply that the value function
10Relative entropy is a measure of the distance between the distributions G and Q.









du · · (see Hansen et al. (2002)). Then ￿ can be







0 e¡‰t [U (ht) ¡ c(xt)ht]dt; subject to (18),(15), (16) and the above entropy
constraint, with · being the maximum speci…cation error that the regulator is willing to
consider. As Hansen et al. (2002) show, the constraint problem and the multiplier problem
are equivalent.
12J (xt;￿) satis…es11






















Jx[F (x) ¡ h + ￿R] + 1
2￿2Jxx
)
A solution for game (20) for any given value of the robustness parameter
￿ will determine the socially optimal robust harvesting policy.
3.1 Robust harvesting rules
The optimality conditions associated with the optimization in the right hand
side of (20) imply
U





Equation (21) is the usual result that at the optimal harvest the net
marginal bene…t of an additional unit of catch must be equal to the resource
cost, whereas equation (22) is the worst possible distortion that is admissible,
which is negative as expected and depends on ￿: When ￿ is large, R is small
and the benchmark model is a good approximation. More speci…cally, when
￿ ! 1 there is no distortion at all and the model yields the same solution
as the typical optimal stochastic control model.
Going through the required derivations (see Appendix A), we obtain the
solution for the evolution of harvesting (in expected terms), which depends






[‰ ¡ F0 (x)](U0 (h) ¡ c(x)) + c0 (x)[F (x) + ￿R]
+1





11t is dropped again to simplify notation.
13substituting the worst case distortion R from …rst order condition (22), we
have the di¤erential equation governing the change of the expected value of






‰ ¡ F 0 (x) ¡ ￿2
￿ c0 (x)
i
(U0 (h) ¡ c(x)) + c0 (x)F (x)
+1




Likewise, the evolution ofthe expected value ofbiomass, after substituting
R from equation (22) into equation (18) and taking expected values, becomes




0 (h) ¡ c(x)) (25)
Equations (24) and (25) summarize the evolution of the expected values
of harvesting and biomass under socially optimal management with robust
control.
4 Robust Equilibrium: Uniqueness and Reg-
ulation
In equilibrium (1=dt)Edh = (1=dt)Edx = 0: Using (24) and recalling that
U0 (h) = P (h); the socially optimal expected steady state harvest under







c0 (x)F (x) + 1
2￿2(c00 (x) ¡ U000 (h)h2
x)
P (h) ¡ c(x)
(26)
Under certainty ￿ = 0, in which case (26) is reduced to the well known rule
for optimal …shery management, equation (11). Similarly, the management
rule under “typical”, risk-type uncertainty in stock-recruitment, without a
preference for robustness, is obtained by setting ￿ 6= 0 and ￿ ! 1:
Solving (26) for P (h) the robust equilibrium market clearing conditions
14become:
p = P (h) =
c(x) ¡
"
c0 (x)F (x) + 1
2￿2(c00 (x) ¡ U000 (h)h2
x)












where condition (28) indicates stationary biomass, x￿(h;￿). Substituting
into (27) we obtain the robust supply curve p = S￿ (h;￿): Then market





￿) : P (h
¤




￿ = P (h
¤
￿) (29)
Setting ￿ ! 1 we obtain the corresponding equilibrium condition under
risk. It is interesting to note that the simpler type of randomness (assuming
a known distribution) a¤ects only the supply curve (27), but not the stock
equilibrium condition (28). However, once we allow for model uncertainty
the stock equilibrium condition is also a¤ected by the robustness parameter,
so that both harvest and stock expected paths are modi…ed. The chosen
equilibrium will depend on ￿ (which is assumed to be exogenous) as well as
￿. Now the interesting question is how to choose an appropriate value for
this parameter. One possibility is to use the detection error probabilities
associated with a given sample of observations for biomass evolution, cal-
culating likelihood ratios between di¤erent worst case distributions and the
benchmark (see Hansen and Sargent (2003)).
Alternatively, the discussion in section 2 suggests that the dynamic …shery
model could be associated with problems of multiple equilibria and bionomic
instabilities, which suggests that ￿ could also be used to eliminate such prob-
lems. To make the point clear, assume that the …shery is controlled using
15only the benchmark model (14), which implies that ￿ ! 1: The dynamic
system for expected harvesting and biomass is de…ned, using (23) and (25)






[‰ ¡ F 0 (x)](U0 (h) ¡ c(x)) + c0 (x)F (x)
+1





(1=dt)Edx = F (x) ¡ h (31)
Suppose that this system has a unique equilibrium with the usual saddle
point property, shown, in Figure 1, as the intersection of _ x1 = 0 and _ h2 = 0
at point E. Assume now that the benchmark model is not the true one, but
that the true one is a distorted model for some RD < 0: Since there are no
robust control considerations by the manager, the corresponding dynamic
system in expected values is given by (30) and
(1=dt)Edx = F (x) ¡ h + R
D
Inthis case while the (1=dt)Edh = 0 isocline remains the same, the (1=dt)Edx =
0 isocline shrinks inward, possibly as far as the _ x2 = 0 isocline in Figure 1,
inducing multiple equilibria at ED
1 ; ED
2 ; and ED
3 . If RD is su¢ciently large
in absolute value, then there could be no steady state equilibrium at all and
the resource might collapse. Thus controlling with the benchmark model
when the distorted model is true could lead to instabilities or even resource
collapse.12
The idea behind stabilization through robust control is to choose a har-
vesting rule such that the system has a unique equilibrium not only for the
benchmark model but for the worst possible distortion R that Nature could
choose. If a unique equilibrium exists under the worst possible distortion,
12These e¤ects will be more profound and detrimental the faster the biomass and harvest
dynamics.
16we want to show that uniqueness will also hold for milder distortions of the
benchmark model.
Under robust control the equilibrium harvesting and biomass are deter-
mined by (24), (25). In this system ￿ can be used as a free parameter.
Therefore, it could be chosen in principle so that the system has a unique
equilibrium. This idea can be explained with the help of Figure 2, which de-
picts again the three equilibria that emerge from the distorted model without
robust control, ED
1 ; ED
2 ; and ED
3 of Figure 1. Choosing a speci…c ￿ implies
that the (1=dt)Edh = 0 and the (1=dt)Edx = 0 isoclines of the system (24),
(25) will shift. The idea is to choose ￿ so that the isoclines shift to positions
such as HRHR and AxR
k ; intersecting only once at point ER:
[Figure 2]
Choosing ￿ this way implies that the preference for robustness is combined
with a preference for uniqueness. A speci…c value of ￿ that guarantees a
unique, stable equilibrium can be translated to a maximum speci…cation
error that the manager or regulator is willing to accept, by recalling ￿
0s role as
multiplier of the entropy constraint in the constraint problem formulation.13
Provided that uniqueness is preserved under milder distortions, the use of
robust control ensures that a unique equilibrium exists for all distortions
from the benchmark case to the worst one. Thus, if a milder distortion shifts
the (1=dt)Edx = 0 isocline to BxM
k in Figure 2, since the robust control
solution …xes the (1=dt)Edh = 0 isocline at HRHR; uniqueness is preserved
at EM:
13The uniqueness - stabilization argument used in this paper can be complementary
to the detection error probability approach. For instance, it is possible that more than
one value of ￿ achieve uniqueness, in which case detection error probabilities can provide
additional input into the …nal choice.
17An approach for choosing such a ￿ can be described as follows. Let
(x;h) 2 A ½ R2
+; where A = (0;hmax) - (0;xmax); xmax > xk: and hmax
su¢ciently large but without violating any technical constraints. Let ￿ 2
£ = (￿;1), where ￿ de…nes the lower bound of admissible values of ￿; ie.
the nonnegative values of ￿ for which the objective function can be larger than
¡1. The (1=dt)Edx = 0 isocline de…nes, using (25), the curve G(x;h;￿) =
0; while the (1=dt)Edh = 0 isocline de…nes, using (24), the curve K (x;h;￿) =
0. If a ￿
¤ exists such that G(x;h;￿
¤) = 0 and K (x;h;￿
¤) = 0 have a unique
solution (x¤;h¤); then robust control leads to a unique equilibrium: Su¢cient
conditions for the existence of such a ￿ can be derived.
Consider the Jacobian determinant of the system (24), (25):
D(x;h;￿) =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Gx (x;h;￿) Gh(x;h;￿)
Kx (x;h;￿) Kh(x;h;￿)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ for (x;h) 2 A; ￿ 2 ~ £ µ £ (32)
where ~ £ is the subset of values of ￿ for which the a solution for the system
exists.
Proposition 1 If D(x;h;￿) does not change sign in A - ~ £ µ £ then a
unique robust equilibrium exists for the expected values of harvest and bio-
mass.
For proof see Appendix B.
A possible illustration of this result can be presented with reference to
Figure 2. The uniqueness condition means that a ￿
¤ is selected such that the
HRHR curve cuts the horizontal axis between A and xR
k; that it is monotonic
increasing at least up to xR
k ; and that the intersection takes place at the
non increasing part of the AxR
k curve.14 At the equilibrium point the slope
14An intersection could take place at the increasing part of the AxR
k curve, but additional
conditions would be required to ensure uniqueness in that case.
18condition for the HRHR and AxR





















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(1=dt)Edx=0
For D(x;h;￿
¤) = GxKh ¡ KxGh < 0 the robust equilibrium has the saddle
point property.
To locate su¢cient conditions for uniqueness to be preserved under milder
distortions, consider a ￿
¤ that provides a unique equilibrium satisfying Propo-
sition 1. For this value of ￿ the triplet (x¤;h¤;￿
¤) will determine a corre-
sponding R¤ which is the worse possible distortion. Consider now arbitrary
distortions ~ R 2 [R¤;0]; with ~ R = 0 corresponding to the benchmark model
and ~ R = R¤ corresponding to the robust model. Thus as R increases toward
zero we have milder distortions and the (1=dt)Edx = 0 isocline shifts. In
terms of Figure 2 this means that the AxR
k curve shifts outwards uniformly.
Keep the HRHR to the robust equilibrium position determined by the triplet
(x¤;h¤;￿
















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(33)
It is clear that ~ D(x;h;R¤) = D(x;h;￿
¤):
Proposition 2 If ~ D
³
x;h; ~ R = 0
´
has the same sign as D(x;h;￿
¤) and it
is monotonic in ~ R then the uniqueness of the robust equilibrium is preserved
under milder distortions in (R¤;0]
For proof see Appendix ??.
In terms of Figure 2, uniqueness is obtained if the (1=dt)Edh = 0 isocline
is increasing at least up to the carrying capacity of the benchmark model.
Furthermore, since AxR
k shifts uniformly outwards, say to Bxm
k in …gure 2,
19while HRHR remains …xed, uniqueness with the saddle point property is
preserved up to the benchmark model.15
Of course it is possible that several ￿ satisfy the su¢cient conditions
described above. In such a case, the value for ￿ can be chosen to ensure
the highest expected value for the robust control problem.16 More formally,
among the set of ￿ that satisfy conditions for uniqueness and preservation of
uniqueness under milder distortions, a ￿
























t (￿); R¤(￿) are solutions of the robust control problem eval-
uated at each ￿:
If a unique robust equilibrium is de…ned, the value obtained for harvest-
ing in these conditions can be used as a robust quantity limit for designing
tradable quota systems. In this case a robust quota is determined by a policy
function hR
t = `(xt) which is the function characterizing an approach path
to the unique robust equilibrium. This is the path RR corresponding to
the one dimensional stable manifold of the saddle point robust equilibrium,
converging to ER in Figure 2.17 This result can be related to the safe quota
concept discussed in Homans and E.Wilen (1997). They assume a quota that
15If milder distortions are realized, updates of the policy might be possible. The analysis
of the updating process for a robust rule is left for future research.
16Given empirical data, the set of allowable ￿ can be narrowed down to those that
generate reasonable detection error probabilities. See footnote 13.
17The stable manifold or equivalently the policy function hR
t = `(xt) can be recovered by
numerical methods. Using the time elimination method, the stable manifold is determined






with initial conditions (x¤;h¤); which is the robust steady state corresponding to ER in
Figure 2.
20is a linear function of the biomass, so that the safe quota is determined as
hS = maxf0;c + dxg; with c < 0; d > 0: Thus if the stock is below some
minimum value then hS = 0 (as negative harvesting is obviously ruled out),
while the quota is below, equal or above biological growth if x T xsafe; re-
spectively. In our case for each stock level the quota is "safe" in the sense
that it ensures that the robust equilibrium biomass is attained in the long
run even under the worst possible scenario for stock-recruitment.
It should be noted that the robust quota rule which attains a steady
state biomass equilibrium for the worst possible case of the stock-recruitment
equation implies smaller harvesting relative to the benchmark model. If the
benchmark model was actually the true model, then with initial condition xR
0
in Figure 2, the benchmark quota would be determined by the stable manifold
NN converging to ED
1 ; which de…nes the policy function hN
t = ˆ (xt): The
di¤erence hN
t ¡hR
t can be interpreted as the reduction in harvesting induced



















will indicate the change in expected steady state welfare between robust and
benchmark rules. Since this di¤erence is negative, it can be interpreted as
the steady state cost of wanting to be robust, or to put it in a di¤erent way,
as the cost of precaution.
5 Concluding Remarks
Bionomic instability is an inherent characteristic of …shery models induced
by a backward bending supply curve. This instability emerges both in open
access and in optimally controlled …sheries. Given the uncertainties associ-
21ated with …sheries, these instabilities could be intensi…ed by demand shocks
or uncertainties associated with the stock-recruitment relationship.
In the present paper we consider the case of scienti…c uncertainty in the
stock-recruitment relationship and we introduce robust control methods in
…shery management. We show that robust control could act as a tool to
prevent instabilities, by an appropriate choice of the robustness parameter.
This is obtained by designing a rule so that the optimally managed …shery
is stable under a worst possible scenario for the stock-recruitment relation-
ship.The robust management rule can be used to design a robust quota rule
that work better than typical prescriptions under uncertainty, both in the
sense of maintaining stable harvests and in avoiding biomass collapse. This
management rule will, however, have a cost in terms of foregone expected
harvesting bene…ts.
The robust harvesting solution can be used as a basis for setting "safe"
quotas to be applied in a …shery. The question of whether and when it
makes sense to update the robustness parameter as more information be-
comes available on stock-recruitment, and thus to update the harvesting rule
accordingly, is one potencially important question which should be addressed
in future research.
Finally, the basic model developed here can also be extended along dif-
ferent lines, such as depensation or non-linear cost e¤ects, or by considering
the …shery as a dynamic game between the planner/regulator and the …sh-
ermen, and seeking robust solutions with possible heterogenous preferences
for robustness.
22A Derivation of optimal solution
This appendix shows how to derive equation (23).
Di¤erentiating the value function with respect to x and using (21) and
(22) we obtain 18
‰Jx = [F (x) ¡ h + ￿R]Jxx ¡ c






since J (x) is a function of the stochastic variable x we have by Ito’s lemma
for Jx (x)





Using equation (18), taking expected values, and dividing by dt we obtain





Substituting in (34) and rearranging with (21), the expected evolution of the
resource cost is
(1=dt)EdJx = [‰ ¡ F
0 (x)](U
0 (h) ¡ c(x)) + c
0 (x)h (37)
To express the solution in terms of the expected evolution of harvesting,
apply the di¤erential operator (1=dt)Ed(¢) to (21)
(1=dt)Ed(U
0 (h) ¡ c(x)) = (1=dt)EdJx (38)
We need to expand the left hand side of (38), by applying Ito’s lemma to





















18For a basic explanation of the methods used in this section see for example Dixit and
Pindyck (1994, Ch.4).
23Since along the optimal path h = h(x); where x is a stochastic variable,
using Ito’s lemma once again yields
dh =
·






dt + ￿hxdz (41)
When taking the expected value, terms of order higher than t go to zero, so
that E (dh)
2 = ￿2h2
xdt; and (40) becomes
EdU

















[‰ ¡ F0 (x)](U0 (h) ¡ c(x)) + c0 (x)[F (x) + ￿R]
+1






B Proof of Proposition 1
We locate su¢cient conditions for the existence of a





minants are di¤erent than zero and do not change sign. Then the implicit
value theorem and the index theorem provide existence and uniqueness under
milder distortions. ¥
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